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Previous investigations examining salient memories have demonstrated that personal memories that are important to individuals 
and contain emotional information are better remembered than neutral events. Using behavioral and brain-imaging experiments, 
the present studies explored whether the previous finding was applicable imagined loss. In a behavioral experiment, a free recall 
paradigm was used to compare the memory performance of individuals who imagined loss with that of individuals who imagined 
importance. The superior memory performance conferred by imagining loss was constrained to ordinary items of low to medium 
importance and did not generalize to vital items. Moreover, brain imaging evidence revealed that the activation in certain brain 
regions was stronger when participants were imagining the loss of ordinary items of low to medium importance compared to vital 
items. These brain regions included cognitive effort-related areas (such as the parietal cortex and middle prefrontal cortex) and 
areas related to emotional experiences and emotion-related memories (such as the amygdala, parahippocampal gyrus, and posteri-
or cingulate gyrus). Our study provides a new way of exploring the superior memory performance when imagining loss and 
enriches the literature on memory enhancement by contributing to a deeper understanding of the psychological mechanisms relat-
ed to the imagining of vital losses.  
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Prior investigations examining salient memories have 
demonstrated that personal memories are important to indi-
viduals and contain emotional information are better re-
membered than neutral events [1]. Research has also re-
vealed that the more closely an object is related to the self, 
the better it is remembered. The best memory recall is ob-
served for information about one’s self, followed by infor-
mation about one’s mother and friends, whereas the poorest 
memory performance is observed for information about 
strangers [2]. This phenomenon occurs because people pay 
more attention to self-referential information, which pro-
motes the organization and elaboration of memories. For 
example, women typically have better memory perfor-
mances for weight-related words given that they care more 
about their weight than men. Men often show better 
memory performance for muscle-related words given that 
they pay more attention to their muscle strength [3]. Addi-
tionally, individuals are more likely to remember emotional 
information compared with information that is lacking in 
emotional importance. Abundant evidence from source 
memory paradigms and remember-know procedures indi-
cates that individuals’ memories are more detailed with re-
gard to emotional information than for neutral information 
[4]. Neuroimaging studies have implicated the prefrontal 
cortex and medial temporal areas in the successful encoding 
of material into episodic memory [5]. The amygdala is also 
activated when emotional memories are recalled [6]. Imag-
ing studies also emphasize that the amygdala’s arous-
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al-mediated influences and its interactions with brain struc-
tures in the frontal and temporal lobes enhance memories. 
From an evolutionary perspective, emotional memory plays 
a vital role in the survival and reproduction of living beings. 
Therefore, events of an emotional nature are instrumental to 
the survival of individuals due to their being better remem-
bered [7]. 
Converging evidence has shown that emotion can be 
elicited and studied through the use of hypothetical scenari-
os [8–13]. One question is whether imagining the loss of 
more important things triggers stronger negative emotions, 
which then results in stronger memory-enhancing effects. 
To address this question, we designed two experiments. In 
the first experiment, participants were assigned to either a 
loss group or an importance group. In an initial encoding 
stage, participants in the loss group were asked to imagine 
and experience how distressed they would feel if they lost 
an item, whereas participants in the importance group were 
asked to think of how important that item was in their life. 
During the memory retrieval stage, the two groups com-
pleted free recall tests, and the memory performances of the 
two groups were analyzed. In the second experiment, we 
investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the imag-
ined loss of vital objects using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI). Based on their level of importance, 
the items presented in the experiments were divided into the 
following three categories: (i) high level (H) for vital ob-
jects (e.g., eyes); (ii) medium level (M) for items of medium 
importance (e.g., glasses); and (iii) low level (L) for items 
of low importance (e.g., a table lamp). 
In the present study, we made three predictions regarding 
salient memory. First, the memory performances for both 
the importance group and the loss group should follow the 
rule that the more important the object, the better the recall. 
In other words, participants should have the best memory 
performance for vital objects, a moderate performance for 
objects of medium importance, and the worst performance 
for items of low importance. Second, given that emotional 
information is better remembered than non-emotional  
information in long-term memory, the memory performance 
of the loss group should be better than that of the im-
portance group. Third, in the loss group, the activation    
of the medial prefrontal cortex, which is involved in pro-
cesses of self-representation [14] and cognitive control [15], 
and the amygdala, the parahippocampal gyrus, and the  
posterior cingulate gyrus, which are associated with emo-
tional experience and emotional memory [16–18], should 
become stronger as the importance of the imagined objects 
increases. 
1   Methods 
1.1   Participants 
All of the participants were healthy university students who 
reported a lack of neurological or psychiatric history. Each 
participant voluntarily enrolled in the study and signed an 
informed consent form prior to the experiment. The Institu-
tional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences approved the experimental 
procedure. 
Seventy students participated in Experiment 1 (17 males, 
21.56 ± 0.25 years), and 28 students participated in Experi-
ment 2 (9 males, 22.93 ± 0.48 years).  
1.2  Stimuli 
We carefully selected 1100 high-frequency Chinese nouns, 
each of which consisted of two characters [19]. Then, the 
relative importance, familiarity, and concreteness of each 
noun were rated by a separate group of 35 participants on a 
7-point scale (1 being unimportant , unfamiliar or abstract 
and 7 being extremely important, familiar or concrete). Im-
portance was defined as how desirable or valuable the item 
was to each individual’s life, and concreteness was defined 
such that an extremely concrete image uses words that can 
be experienced as sensations or feelings. The final stimulus 
set consisted of three categories of nouns. 
For Experiment 1, the set consisted of 15 vital nouns 
with high importance ratings (mean ± SE = 6.26 ± 0.06),  
15 trivial nouns with medium ratings (mean ± SE = 4.39   
± 0.11), and 15 trivial nouns with low ratings (mean ± SE  
= 2.95 ± 0.99). For Experiment 2, the set consisted of    
20 vital nouns with high importance ratings (mean ± SE = 
5.91 ± 0.08), 20 trivial nouns with medium ratings (mean  
± SE = 4.02 ±0.04), and 20 trivial nouns with low ratings 
(mean ± SE = 2.72 ± 0.14). When the frequency, number  
of strokes, familiarity and concreteness ratings were    
held constant (Ps >0.05), there was a significant difference 
in the importance ratings between any two categories (Ps 
<0.001). 
1.3  Procedure 
In a double-blind design, the participants in Experiment 1 
were assigned to either the loss group or the importance 
group. The participants were exposed to two specific “loss” 
examples in the loss group and two specific “importance” 
examples in the importance group. The first loss example 
was the “Loss of cola”. Participants first drank a small 
amount of cola and described its flavor. They were then told 
that they would not get to drink cola ever again if the word 
“cola” was presented on the screen. The second loss exam-
ple was the “Loss of eyes”. Participants were told that they 
would be blind for the rest of their lives if the word “eyes” 
was presented on the screen. We used black cloths to cover 
participants’ eyes and asked them to blindly search for shut-
tlecocks in a room. During this session, we told the partici-
pants that this task was neither a game nor an ability test; 
rather, it was being conducted to make them imagine and 
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experience the feeling of losing their eyes. In the im-
portance group, participants were only instructed to imagine 
and experience the importance of cola and their eyes in their 
lives and to report on their experiences. 
Experiment 1 consisted of the following three parts: (i) 
encoding, (ii) memory interference, and (iii) memory re-
trieval. During the initial encoding stage, 49 Chinese words 
were presented. To avoid primacy and recency effects due 
to the presentation order, four words were presented at the 
beginning and end of the encoding stage, which were not 
included in the data analysis. Each trial began with a 10-s 
presentation of a word. Participants were told either to im-
agine and experience the distress of losing this item (loss 
group) or to imagine how important this item was in their 
lives (importance group). A fixation cross was shown dur-
ing the interstimulus interval for 2 ± 1 s. The three types of 
words (H, M, and L conditions) were presented using a 
Latin Square experimental design. Each word subtended a 
visual angle of 2.11°×4.11°. During the memory interfer-
ence stage, a three-digit number was presented, and partici-
pants were asked to continually subtract 3 from this number 
while saying the calculation out loud for 1 min. In the 
memory retrieval stage, participants performed a free recall 
task for 10 min that included 45 words (15 high importance 
words, 15 medium importance words and 15 low im-
portance words).  
At the end of the experiment, participants in the loss 
group were asked to retrospectively recall and describe their 
emotional states while they were imagining the loss of the 
low, medium, and high importance items. The evaluations 
of the emotional state included the participants’ desire to 
escape imagining the loss and their escape behavior. These 
two items were evaluated on a 7-point scale (“1”: not at all 
to “7”: extremely) with the order of these measures coun-
terbalanced. We provided the list of items from the three 
conditions to help participants’ memory retrieval. 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as the one 
used with the loss group in Experiment 1 except that the 
memory interference and memory retrieval stages were re-
moved (Figure 1). 
1.4  Image acquisition and analysis 
During MRI scanning, imaging data were obtained with a  
 
 
Figure 1   Design for Experiment 1. A depiction of the three different 
experimental conditions. The Chinese words in the figure, “台灯”, “汽车”, 
and ”双腿”, mean “lamp”, “car”, and “legs”, respectively. 
3-T SIEMENS Magnetom Allegra System (Siemens,   
Erlangen, Germany) using a whole brain T2*-weighted gra-
dient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (32 transverse 
slices covering the entire brain were acquired using a gra-
dient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence, repetition time = 
2000 ms, echo time = 30 ms, field of view = 220 ms, flip 
angle = 90°; matrix 64 × 64 × 32, and spatial resolution,  
3.4 mm × 3.4 mm × 3 mm) with a standard head coil at  
the Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance Im-
aging to measure changes in blood oxygenation level-  
dependent (BOLD) signals. Anatomical images were ob-
tained using a standard 3D T1-weighted sequence (matrix 
256 × 256 × 128; spatial resolution, 0.938 mm × 0.938 mm 
× 1.33 mm, repetition time = 2530 ms, TI = 1100 ms, TE = 
3.98 ms). 
We used the statistical parametric mapping software 
SPM (Version 5; Welcome Department of Cognitive Neu-
rology, London, UK) for image preprocessing and statistical 
analyses. Prior to preprocessing, the first five functional EPI 
volumes were discarded to allow for T1 stabilization. The 
remaining functional images were realigned to the first scan 
to correct for head movement. Subsequently, these images 
were normalized to a standard EPI template at the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) with a 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm 
resample voxel size. Then, the normalized images were spa-
tially smoothed using a Gaussian filter with an 8-mm full 
width half maximum (FWHM) to decrease differences in 
individual structural brain anatomy and to increase the sig-
nal-to-noise ratio. 
To assess the neural activity associated with the three 
experimental conditions, the three loss decision conditions 
were separately modeled using a box-car function and con-
volved with the canonical hemodynamic response function 
that is built into SPM5. Images were high-pass filtered (128 
s) to remove low-frequency signal drifts. A first-order auto-
regressive model (AR-1) was used to estimate the temporal 
autocorrelations by using restricted maximum likelihood 
estimates of variance components.  
In the statistical analysis of the fMRI data, experimental 
conditions L, M and H were defined as three separate re-
gressors on the first level. We separately contrasted the L, 
M, and H conditions with a fixation condition. For the sec-
ond level of analysis, these contrast parameter estimates 
were submitted to a full factorial group analysis (ANOVA: 
a one-way analysis of variance) to allow for population in-
ference using a random-effect model. To find regions that 
are commonly active during the processing of any imagined 
loss, we performed a conjunction analysis of the L-H and 
M-H conditions. During the whole-brain search, all of the 
results from the random effect analysis were thresholded at 
a combined voxel and cluster-size threshold of P<0.001 
(uncorrected) and a cluster extent of k > 20. Unless other-
wise specified, we only reported clusters that were signifi-
cant at P < 0.05 (corrected for multiple non-independent 
comparisons). 
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2  Results 
2.1  Behavioral results 
Figure 2 presents the recall accuracy of the loss and im-
portance groups for each stimulus type. A mixed model 
ANOVA was applied to these data, and the 23 factors 
were group type (importance group, loss group) and stimu-
lus type (low, medium, high). The main result was a signif-
icant effect of stimulus type (F(2,136) = 57.96, P <0.001) 
and group type (F(1,68) = 6.33, P < 0.05). There was also a 
significant interaction between group type and stimulus type 
(F(2,136) = 6.86, P <0.01). Further tests revealed signifi-
cant differences (Ps < 0.001) in the accuracy levels of the 
importance group: L (mean ± SE = 36.19 ± 2.54), M (mean 
± SE = 47.81 ± 1.90) and H (mean ± SE = 64.38 ± 2.58) (Ps 
< 0.001). In the loss group, the accuracy of the L condition 
(mean ± SE = 47.24 ± 2.24) was significantly lower than the 
M (mean ± SE = 55.81 ± 1.82) and H (mean ± SE = 61.52 ± 
2.08) conditions (Ps <0.01); however, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the M and H conditions (P = 0.08). 
Furthermore, in the L and M conditions, the accuracy in the 
loss group was significantly higher than in the importance 
group (Ps < 0.01), yet there was no significant difference 
between the two groups (P = 0.39) in the high importance 
condition.  
The self-reported escape desire and behavior ratings for 
the imagined loss are shown in Figure 3 for the three condi-
tions in Experiment 1. A separate repeated measures 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
analyze the average escape desire and behavior ratings for 
the three (L, M, and H) imagined loss conditions.  
The imagined loss condition had a significant effect on 
the escape desire ratings (F(2,68) = 498.91) and the escape 
behavior ratings (F(2,68) = 120.19) (P < 0.001). Further-
more, the differences in the escape desire ratings for the 
imagined loss were significant (P < 0.001) between condi-
tions, as follows: the L condition (mean ± SE = 2.34 ± 0.15), 
the M condition (mean ± SE = 3.68 ± 0.12) and the H con-
dition (mean ± SE = 6.21 ± 0.11, Ps < 0.001). The differ-
ences in the escape behavior ratings were also significant  
(P < 0.001) between the condition values, as follows: the L  
 
 
Figure 2  Accuracy (percentage correct) for the loss and importance 
groups for each stimulus category in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3  Self-reported ratings of escape desire and escape behavior in 
each loss imagination condition in Experiment 1. 
condition (mean ± SE = 2.13 ± 0.17), the M condition 
(mean ± SE = 3.24 ± 0.18) and the H condition (mean ± SE 
= 5.45 ± 0.28, Ps < 0.001). Further analysis found that the 
self-reported ratings values for escape desire and escape 
behavior were significantly positively correlated (rH-M= 
0.584, rH-L= 0.577, Ps < 0.001). Here, H-M represents the 
difference between high and medium importance values, 
and H-L represents the difference between high and low 
importance values. Moreover, the self-reported ratings val-
ues for escape behavior and participants’ performance on 
the free recall test were significantly negatively correlated 
(rH-M = −0.362, P < 0.05). 
The self-reported escape desire and behavior ratings for 
imagining loss in Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 4. Sep-
arate repeated measures one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) were conducted to analyze the average escape 
desire and behavior ratings in the three imagined loss condi-
tions.  
The imagined loss condition had a significant effect on 
the escape desire ratings (F(2,54) = 31.38) and the escape 
behavior ratings (F(2,54) = 9.21) (P < 0.001). For the es-
cape desire ratings, the H condition (mean ± SE = 5.39 ± 
0.29) was significantly (Ps < 0.001) greater than both the L 
condition (mean ± SE = 3.36 ± 0.23) and the M condition 
(mean ± SE = 3.79 ± 0.28); however, no significant differ-
ence was observed between the L and M conditions. For the  
 
 
Figure 4  Self-reported ratings of escape desire and escape behavior in 
each loss imagination condition in Experiment 2. 
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escape behavior ratings, the H condition (mean ± SE = 3.43 
± 0.40) was significantly (Ps < 0.001) greater than the L 
condition (mean ± SE = 2.18 ± 0.24), yet no significant dif-
ference was observed between the M condition (mean ± SE 
= 2.79 ± 0.30) and either of the other conditions. 
2.2  Imaging results for Experiment 2 
Neural activation associated with vital loss-related imagin-
ing. To identify the brain regions that are specifically asso-
ciated with imagining vital loss, we contrasted the H condi-
tion with the L and M conditions. There were no significant 
clusters when comparing the H and L conditions or the H 
and M conditions. In contrast, comparisons revealed signif-
icant clusters distributed across a wide network (including 
the parahippocampal gyrus, inferior parietal lobe, posterior 
cingulate gyrus (PCC), medial temporal lobe (MTL), rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) and medial prefrontal cor-
tex) when comparing the L and H conditions (Figure 5(a), 
Table 1). Furthermore, a contrast of the M and L conditions  
 
 
Figure 5  Responses related to imagining vital loss. (a) Selected brain 
regions show significant activations in the contrast of the L minus H condi-
tions, including the medial prefrontal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and 
PCC. (b) Selected brain regions showing significant activations when 
comparing the M and the H conditions, including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, amygdala, and PCC. MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Ph, parahip-
pocampal gyrus; Amg, amygdala; PCC, posterior cingulate gyrus. 
Table 1  Brain activations in the L vs. H conditions a) 




KE x y z 
R. medial PFC 10 18 51 −6 3.72 21 
R. rACC 32 12 51 −15 3.31  
R. MTL  20 57 −45 −15 3.77 39 
 20 63 −36 −18 3.52  
R. parahippocampal gyrus 30 15 −48 0 3.46 124 
L. PCC 31 −3 −30 33 4.15 70 
R. inferior parietal lobule 40 48 −42 63 4 194 
a) Only clusters (with local maxima coordinates) up to the threshold of 
P < 0.05 corrected with 20 or more contiguous voxels were reported. 
revealed significant activations in the parahippocampal gy-
rus, amygdala, PCC, MTL, medial prefrontal cortex, and 
rACC (Figure 5(b), Table 2). Activated regions from the 
conjunction analysis of the L-H and M-H conditions are 
shown in Table 3. 
3  Discussion  
3.1  Memory was enhanced when imagining the loss of 
low and medium importance objects 
In the first experiment, the memory performances of the 
importance group improved as the importance level of a 
category increased. In the loss group, items of medium im-
portance were recalled more accurately compared with items 
of low importance. The more important and self-related the 
information, the better the recall was for the contributions of 
elaborative and organizational processes [3,20]. The loss 
group more accurately recalled items of low and medium 
importance than the importance group. In both conditions, 
imagining the loss of items triggered negative feelings in the 
participants, which is consistent with the enhancement of 
emotional memory; that is, emotional information is better 
remembered than neural information [4,21,22]. 
Table 2  Brain activations in the M vs. H conditions a) 




KE x y z 
R. medial PFC 8 6 36 39 3.84 136 
R. dACC 32 12 33 42 3.78  
R. middle PFC 10 39 42 0 4.34 77 
L. inferior PFC 46 −54 33 12 4.24 46 
L. MTL  37 −63 −54 −6 3.62 161 
 37 −42 −60 0 3.59  
R. parahippocampal gyrus 36 42 −27 −21 4.17 207 
R. amygdala − 33 −6 −18 3.74 20 
R. PCC 30 18 −63 9 3.75 253 
L. PCC 30 −18 −66 12 4.14 64 
a) Only clusters (with local maxima coordinates) up to the threshold of 
P < 0.05 corrected with 20 or more contiguous voxels were reported. 
Table 3  Activated regions from the conjunction analysis of the L-H and 
M-H conditions a) 




KE x y z 
R. Cuneus 23 15 −78 12 4.5 102 
R. Lingual Gyrus 19 15 −54 3 3.32  
R. MTL  20 57 −42 −15 3.75 18 
R. Postcentral Gyrus 5 45 −42 63 3.58 20 
R. middle PFC 10 39 45 0 3.51 15 
R. medial PFC 10 18 54 −6 3.5 10 
a) Only clusters (with local maxima coordinates) up to the threshold of 
P < 0.001 uncorrected with 10 or more contiguous voxels were reported. 
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Why were items of medium importance and low im-
portance better recalled by the loss group than by the im-
portance group? Emotional information, which is aroused 
by imagining loss, is better remembered than a neutral event 
[4,21,22]. For example, individuals’ memories were more 
vivid and detailed for negative words than for neutral words 
[4]. Negative pictures (compared with neutral pictures) 
significantly enhanced memory performance. The left 
amygdala and the right hippocampus were more active dur-
ing the intentional encoding of negative pictures compared 
to the encoding of neutral pictures [23]. To our knowledge, 
this study provides the first demonstration that the improved 
memory performance that is gained from imagined loss is 
limited to ordinary objects of low and medium importance. 
This result supports and enriches the field of salient 
memory content. 
3.2  Memory performance might not be enhanced by 
the imagined loss of vital objects 
With regard to salient memory, vital items elicited im-
proved memory performance in the loss group compared 
with the importance group, which is similar to the result for 
items of low and medium importance. However, the 
memory performances of the loss and importance groups 
were not different for high importance items, and the 
memory performance of the loss group was not different for 
high importance and medium importance items. This find-
ing contradicts existing research that suggests that emotion-
al or important personal memories are typically better re-
membered than general memories [1]. Our behavioral re-
sults suggest that recall is not improved by imagining the 
loss of vital items. 
The brain imaging results showed stronger brain activa-
tion when people imagined the loss of items of low and me-
dium importance compared with those of high importance. 
Participants reported having a stronger desire and also de-
scribed stronger avoidance behaviors to avoid imagining the 
loss of a vital object than the loss of low or medium im-
portance objects. There were stronger activations in the pa-
rietal lobe, medial prefrontal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, 
rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and posterior cingulate 
gyrus when people imagined losing low importance objects 
compared to high importance objects. Similarly, there were 
greater activations in the dorsal cingulate cortex, dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, amygdala, parahippocampal gyrus, 
and posterior cingulate gyrus for the imagined loss of me-
dium importance objects compared to vital objects. The 
dorsolateral frontal cortex and parietal lobe are important 
for cognitive control and task difficulty; their activities re-
flect the cognitive effort of imagined loss processing 
[24,25]. More effort is required to imagine the loss of items 
of low and medium importance than those of vital im-
portance. The medial prefrontal cortex’s activity reflects the 
processing of self-reference information [14]. This activity 
indicates that people’s imagination might be more closely 
linked with items in their own lives when they imagine the 
loss of items of low and medium importance compared with 
imagining the loss of vital items. The activated areas of the 
amygdala, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingu-
late gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus process emotional 
experiences and emotion-related memories [17,18]. In par-
ticular, the amygdala is well-known for responding to high-
ly threatening and negative information [16], and the rACC 
is associated with negative utility and emotional conflict 
[26–28]. Compared with imagining a vital loss, emotional 
memories and emotion-related experiences were more ex-
tensively processed when participants imagined the loss of 
items of low and medium importance. Conjunction analyses 
have indicated that the MTL, Middle PFC, and medial PFC 
were activated when participants were imagining a loss. 
Functional neuroimaging studies have highlighted the en-
gagement of a common neural network consisting of the 
medial prefrontal cortex (Brodmann’s area BA 10) and 
MTL (medial temporal lobe) when participants are engaged 
in imagining future events and remembering past events 
[29–33]. Therefore, the activations of the MTL, Middle 
PFC, and medial PFC may be associated with the amount of 
hard effort needed to imagine a loss during the encoding 
stage. Based on our brain imaging evidence, memory per-
formance could not be enhanced by imagining the loss of 
vital items, as was expected. 
Why do our study’s behavioral and brain-imaging results 
contradict previous research examining the salient memory 
of vital objects? Previous studies have found that human 
beings make scenic costs to maintain their own lives, as 
well as other vital things, such as wellness, love, glory, jus-
tice and personal rights. Each of these things can be re-
garded as extremely crucial, absolute, scared, and non- ne-
gotiable [34–36]. These items may be considered irreplace-
able [37,38], and their loss may present a greater threat to 
the survival and reproduction of human beings than the loss 
of routine items, such as fortune [39]. The loss of vital items 
may cause strong feelings of threat or anxiety. People will 
often use psychological defense mechanisms to avoid or 
mediate these feelings [40]. These mechanisms may auto-
matically stop or prevent people from imagining emotions 
that are related to losing vital items, which is consistent 
with previous studies examining memories of extremely 
painful incidents. Freud discovered that his patients en-
countered great difficulty when recalling painful experienc-
es that they had suffered during their childhoods. There 
seemed to be an enormous power that prevented the memo-
ries of such painful experiences from entering people’s 
consciousness; this phenomenon is called “depression” [41]. 
Anxious people prefer to avoid elaborate processing of neg-
ative thoughts during early periods of attention processing. 
Additionally, anxious individuals remember less about neg-
ative items than individuals in control groups [42–45]. Vital 
things, such as success, self-esteem, and love, are so im-
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portant to people that they often repress memories about 
their past failures (e.g., losing face, complaints against their 
lovers, or the names of people who they do not like). Often, 
people cannot even recall these unpleasant things [46]. Hu-
man beings tend to be optimistic and prefer imagining posi-
tive things while avoiding negative images. This optimism 
may trigger adaptive behaviors and improve physical and 
mental health [9,47,48]. Repressing painful or dangerous 
ideas may be an effective self-protection mechanism 
[49,50].  
The self-reported escape behavior ratings of the loss 
group increased with the importance level of the items. Par-
ticipants evoked their psychological defense mechanisms in 
all three loss conditions, and the degree of defense increased 
with the importance of the items. Additionally, we analyzed 
the correlation between the self-reported ratings values for 
escape with participants’ recall performance. The results 
show that the self-reported ratings values for escape desire 
and escape behavior were significantly positively correlated. 
This result indicates that when participants imagined the 
loss of an important item, the more important that item was, 
the greater the participants felt the desire to escape, which 
increases the actual possibility of escape behavior occurring. 
Moreover, the self-reported ratings values for escape be-
havior and participants’ performance on the free recall test 
were significantly negatively correlated, which means that 
the accuracy of recall performance decreases with the in-
creased possibility of escape behavior occurring. A reason-
able explanation for this finding is that low and medium 
importance items are ordinary and easily replaced [39], 
whereasvital items are irreplaceable [37,38]. Therefore, the 
psychological defense triggered by the imagined loss of 
vital items may involve a qualitative change from the de-
fense triggered by items of low and medium importance. 
This change may suppress an individual’s imagination and 
the emotions related to losing the item. As imagination and 
emotional arousal decrease, the brain’s activation reduces. 
Thus, in our study, participants’ memory performance was 
not consistent with other salient memory research. 
4  Limitations and prospects 
An important alternative explanation for the inconsistency 
between our results regarding imagining the loss of vital 
things and previous salient memory results is that present 
results may have been caused by a ceiling effect. The term 
“ceiling effect” refers to the level above which the variance 
of an independent variable is no longer measured or esti-
mated [51,52]. If the ceiling effect played an important role 
in memory performance in our study, accuracy of recalled 
items would have been very high. However, the highest 
accuracy was only 61.52%, indicating that a ceiling effect 
did not the cause of the inconsistency between our findings 
and previous results. 
In the present study, an accidental free recall memory 
test was used to avoid participants to memorize the words 
for a good performance, rather than to image the loss situa-
tion according to the requirement of the task. However, to 
prevent the floor effect for memeory performance in the 
different conditions, the number of items to encode was 
small, making it hard to analyze differences between accu-
rately and inaccurately recalled words by comparing the 
relevant brain activation areas during the encoding stage in 
the L, M, and H conditions. Future research should explore 
encoding differences in brain areas when either successfully 
or abortively retrieval items, and among imaging different 
important items lost at the same time by increasing the 
number of items. These next steps will help further clarify 
the mechanism for psychological defense and forgetting. 
In summary, our study reveals that recall is enhanced by 
the imagined loss of low and medium importance items but 
that this effect does not generalize to vital items. These 
findings will enrich research on enhanced memory and con-
tribute to a better understanding of the psychological 
mechanism for the imagined loss of vital items. Further-
more, our findings have great significance for the effective 
regulation of emotions. Given that imagining loss arouses 
negative emotions (which always hurt fitness costs) [53], 
self-defense mechanisms help buffer the effect of these 
emotions [40,41]. Our study has improved the understand-
ing of adaptive behavior and has elucidated emotion regula-
tion. 
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